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ABSTRACT 
 
Active Traffic Management (ATM) systems have been introduced by transportation agencies to 
manage recurrent and non-recurrent congestion. ATM systems rely on the interconnectivity of 
components made possible by wired and/or wireless networks. Unfortunately, this connectivity 
that supports ATM systems also provides potential system access points that results in 
vulnerability to cyberattacks. This is becoming more pronounced as ATM systems begin to 
integrate internet of things (IoT) devices. Hence, there is a need to rigorously evaluate ATM 
systems for cyberattack vulnerabilities, and explore design concepts that provide stability and 
graceful degradation in the face of cyberattacks. 
 
In this research, a prototype ATM system along with a real-time cyberattack monitoring system 
were developed for a 1.5-mile section of I-66 in Northern Virginia. The monitoring system 
detects deviation from expected operation of an ATM system by comparing lane control states 
generated by the ATM system with lane control states deemed most likely by the monitoring 
system. This comparison provides the functionality to continuously monitor the system for 
abnormalities that would result from a cyberattack. In case of any deviation between two sets of 
states, the monitoring system displays the lane control states generated by the back-up data 
source.  
 
In a simulation experiment, the prototype ATM system and cyberattack monitoring system were 
subject to emulated cyberattacks. The evaluation results showed that the ATM system, when 
operating properly in the absence of attacks, improved average vehicle speed in the system to 
60mph (a 13% increase compared to the baseline case without ATM). However, when subject to 
cyberattack, the mean speed reduced by 15% compared to the case with the ATM system and 
was similar to the baseline case. This illustrates that the effectiveness of the ATM system was 
negated by cyberattacks. The monitoring system however, allowed the ATM system to revert to 
an expected state with a mean speed of 59mph and reduced the negative impact of cyberattacks. 
These results illustrate the need to revisit ATM system design concepts as a means to protect 
against cyberattacks in addition to traditional system intrusion prevention approaches. 
 
 
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Active Traffic Management, Connected vehicles, Real time 
monitoring system, VISSIM  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cybersecurity is a broad term referring to processes and practices designed to protect networks, 
computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access (1). In today’s 
connected world, cybersecurity is an emerging threat in every field that relies upon 
communications. Therefore, transportation operation and management systems utilizing wired 
and wireless communications for managing roadways are also at significant risk of such 
cyberattacks. While the use of smart devices and communications provides new features and 
functionality, they also introduce new risks.  
 
Arabo (2) stated that with the emergence of internet of things (IoT) devices, many of which are 
beginning to be used in traffic management systems, the traditional strategy of isolating control 
systems from other networks will no longer be feasible. Similarly, Jang-Jaccard and Nepal (3) 
also stated that the exponential growth of internet connections has led to a significant growth of 
cyberattacks. Traditionally malware attacks (which are secretly acting against the will of users) 
used to happen at a single point of surface amongst vulnerable components. Hence, rather than 
protecting each asset, the perimeter defense strategy (using firewall or antivirus) was utilized but 
such efforts are now ineffective. The major drawbacks of greater use of information and 
communications technology (ICT) are greater cybersecurity risks (4).  
 
Transportation operations and management systems in the past were closed proprietary systems 
(isolated systems), having very limited cyber vulnerabilities. With the emergence of cloud or 
network computing and continued reliance on emerging technology such as IoT, those 
proprietary systems have now transformed into more open systems (5) with increased 
accessibility. Furthermore, the National Transportation Communication for ITS Protocol 
(NTCIP) uses center to center communications that rely on request based protocols through 
XML messages (6). These protocols have no security built into them and rely on the assumption 
that most attacks are from the inside and hackers make up only a small portion of total intrusions, 
thus, further increasing the risk over proprietary systems (7). In this regard, the USDOT has 
taken a huge initiative to develop security credential management system (SCMS) (8)- a message 
security solution for vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communication. 
Active traffic management (ATM) involves the ability to manage recurrent and non-recurrent 
congestion using real time and predictive operational strategies. An ATM system can be 
deployed either in isolation to address a specific need such as the use of adaptive ramp metering 
to control the flow of traffic entering the freeway or can be used in conjunction with other 
systems to meet network wide needs of congestion management, incident management, traveler 
information and safety resulting in synergetic gains. Motorists rely on information received via 
ATM systems for making travel decisions. Thus, making the validity of such information even 
more critical but these modern open protocol systems leverages on continuous communication 
between roadway and traffic management center (TMC). This dependency on communication 
opens up a wide array of entry points, which makes them vulnerable to cyberattacks and are the 
least understood in terms of cybersecurity.  
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The research presented in this paper is based on the premise that perfect protection from 
cyberattacks is not realistic. Furthermore, a system may also be attacked internally by a 
disgruntled employee. Therefore, this research chose to develop a real-time threat monitoring 
system to continuously check to see if the system is behaving as expected. This paper is further 
structured as follows. First, a literature review is presented to analyze relevant studies and how 
different fields perceive cybersecurity. Then, the next section describes the effort made to 
develop a prototype ATM system. This is followed by a section that identifies various attack 
points in the prototype ATM system and presents examples of architecture for the monitoring 
system. Then next section explains the development of a monitoring system and finally an 
evaluation is conducted for identifying the impact of a possible attack on the prototype ATM 
system, and benefits of reverting back to a safe lane control state using a monitoring system.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Although different fields have realized the importance of Cybersecurity and various studies have 
been conducted on cyber issues of control systems but transportation industry is still lagging in 
this field. Cherdantseva et al. (9) reviewed the state of the art practice in cybersecurity risk 
assessment of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems and proposed that 
security was not the primary concern in standalone SCADA systems in the past, which was 
achieved by controlling physical access to system components. However, the situation has now 
changed and several standards and directives relating to the cybersecurity of SCADA systems 
have emerged. They examined the advantages and drawbacks of the analyzed risk assessment 
methods and concluded by stating that despite large number of methods for risk assessment of 
SCADA systems, there is still room for future research and improvement in terms of overcoming 
failure and developing monitoring systems. Similarly, Woo and Kim (10) provided quantitative 
assessment of cybersecurity risk of SCADA system based on optimal power flow in smart grid 
system and quantified vulnerabilities by first defining relevance of threat to each component and 
then assigning vulnerability index to each component based on historical data. The study finally 
calculated risk based on monetary terms as a product of probabilities of a threat and 
vulnerabilities, and the cost of an asset and concluded that this was a starting stage for 
quantifying cyber risks. C’ardenas et al. (11) used a chemical reactor for developing an anomaly 
detection monitoring system based on cyberattacks that change the behavior of targeted control 
system. The paper used simulation to test attacks and their impact on Tennessee Eastman process 
control system model using irreversible reaction inside a reactor of fixed volume and proposed 
an automatic response mechanism- that monitors the system. Another study evaluated the 
disruption of electric power system caused by cyberattacks while stating that cyber systems 
forms the backbone of nation’s critical infrastructure. The paper stated that interdependence 
among computers, communication and power infrastructure have increased the risk of 
cyberattacks and proposed a real-time monitoring and anomaly detection system along with 
impact analysis. The impact analysis involved analysis of intrusion behaviors and evaluation of 
consequences of cyberattacks based on potential loss of power (12). Wu et al. (13) also used an 
integrated adaptive cybersecurity monitoring system to provide cyberattack awareness for 
scientific and military applications. The paper further used sensor data from networks and large 
number of simulations to evaluate the performance of the proposed monitoring system. 
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Similarly, Ashok et al. (14) proposed applications based on wide area monitoring system for 
power grid security. The paper provides architectural concepts pertaining to monitoring systems 
for anomaly detections and mitigation.   
In recent years, several attacks have been reported on transportation operation and management 
systems compromising the safety (15) and security of these systems. During summer of 2011, a 
cyberattack carried out by a group known as “Anonymous” against a metropolitan transit system 
compromised personal identifiable information (PII) such as customer names, addresses, emails, 
ID numbers and passwords for more than 200 customers (16). During July 2009, several 
hardware experts revealed the vulnerabilities of a parking meter by hacking a parking meter in 
San Francisco with unlimited credit parking card using reverse engineering techniques (17). 
More recently, a group of experts demonstrated their ability to hack Jeep Cherokee connected car 
equipped with Uconnect system. Using the IP address, the two hackers were able to turn the 
engine of the car off, activate and de-activate the brakes, take remote control of the vehicle’s 
information display and entertainment system, and activate the windshield wipers (18). Hacking 
of dynamic message signs (DMS) are frequently in the news, and on recent Memorial Day 
Weekend, again DMS signs were hacked with signs ranging from political slogans to “Party 
Yardy Hall!” and a week later displaying a statement regarding recent Cincinnati Zoo gorilla 
incident (19).  
 
With these attacks on transportation infrastructure systems over the past several years, the 
conventional wisdom is that cybersecurity is a critical and growing issue.  Yet, there has been 
little research in the area. Folk (20) first provided a brief overview of cybersecurity issues in 
transportation systems along with a history of some past attacks and later (21) provided 
fundamentals of common cyberattack process and offered ideas on how to prepare and respond 
to an incident. Similarly, Amoozadeh et al. (22) evaluated the effects of cyberattacks on 
communication channel as well as sensor tampering of a connected vehicle (CV) stream 
equipped to achieve cooperative adaptive cruise control (CACC) using a simulation model. Their 
results revealed that an insider attack can cause significant instability in CACC vehicle stream 
and they also proposed various countermeasures such as downgrading to adaptive cruise control 
(ACC), that could be used to improve security and safety of connected vehicles (23). Since there 
is no way to eliminate cyberattacks completely and no rigorous study exist on cyber 
vulnerabilities of transportation operations and management systems, this paper tries to fill this 
gap in literature by providing a first attempt to evaluate the impact of cyber vulnerabilities of 
transportation operation and management systems and proposing a real-time monitoring system 
for detecting cyberattacks to avoid the consequences of a compromised system. It should be 
noted that deploying monitoring system is a well-accepted concept in cybersecurity risk 
assessment for detecting anomalies (12–14). 
 
STUDY LOCATION 
 
The ATM system deployed on I-66 from Washington, D.C line to Route 29 in Gainesville, 
Virginia was used as a case study in this research and is presented in Figure 1. The ATM system 
consists of speed harmonization, queue warning, hard shoulder running and lane control states. 
These systems were deployed for improving safety and incident management at heavy bottleneck 
locations that averaged 60,000 vehicles per day between US-15 and Fairfax Line. The number 
further increased to 90,000 vehicles per day between the Fairfax line and I-495 while reduced to 
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64,500 vehicles per day between I-495 and Arlington Co-Line. Similarly, highest crash 
frequency existed at SR 7100 and I-495. This study modeled a 1.5-mile section of the I-66 ATM 
system in VISSIM for cybersecurity evaluation. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF A PROTOTYPE ATM SYSTEM  
 
A prototype ATM system was developed first based on the concept of operations of the actual 
ATM system on I-66. The various steps involved are presented in Figure 2 and a detailed 
description for each step is provided below.  
 
VISSIM Simulation 
 
A microscopic traffic simulation of the corridor was developed to serve as the “real world” in our 
prototype system. This allowed the research team to see the impact of the ATM system, both 
without attacks and under attack, on the transportation system. This step involved the modeling 
of test bed network in microsimulation software VISSIM shown in Figure 3. The testbed 
network consists of a 1.5-mile segment of a freeway corridor with three lanes in one direction. 
For the variable lane control state system, two gantries (each with a set of three states displaying 
either open, closed, or merge) were placed at the mileposts 0.5mile and 1mile along the corridor. 
A traffic incident was modeled within the most downstream section between milepost 1 and 1.5 
miles. The network was loaded with a vehicular volume of 3000, 4500 and 6000 vehicles per 
hour to represent low, medium and high congestion conditions of traffic. 
 
Data Collection 
 
During this step, various detector stations were embedded in the VISSIM network at each lane 
near each gantry. The detectors recorded traffic measurements such as speed and traffic volume, 
which were aggregated within the predetermined data collection interval (every 10 sec). Using 
the COM interface, the traffic measurement data was retrieved at every update instance and sent 
to the ATM algorithm.  
 
Data Analysis 
 
In this step, the data collected from the simulation was processed and analyzed to identify 
whether there is a disruption of flow on the network. The analysis was based on speed of 
vehicles dropping below a threshold or speed at one instant of time being lower than the speed at 
preceding instant of time. The algorithm used for incident detection is provided below; 
 
 
 
 and  
 
Where U denotes speed, Q denotes volume, i represents lane under study and j denotes the other 
two lanes. Similarly, t represents a particular instant of time and t-1 represents the immediately 
preceding instant of time. Hence, the algorithm detects incidents if speeds or volume on a lane 
under consideration drops to zero or the speed at one particular instant of time is lower than 
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another instant of time and the speed in the opposing two lanes at that instant of time is greater 
than the speed at the preceding instant of time. 
 
Selection of Lane Control States Using Decision Tree 
 
During this step, the lane control states were selected based on the set of decision trees 
developed based on the concept of operations of the actual ATM system on I-66 – see Figure 4. 
The lane control policy was decided based on the traffic speed collected through detector stations 
embedded in the VISSIM model while the variable lane control state application was modeled 
using VISSIM API and C# language. This policy is consistent with ATM control used for 
operation on I-66 (24).  The decision tree used for selecting lane control states consist of four 
critical decision variables namely, speed, event, distance to the event and the lane on which the 
event is occurring. The first critical variable to be screened for deciding the appropriate lane 
control state for display is speed and if for instance, a speed greater than 20mph is selected, the 
next critical variable of event is screened. It has three decision variables namely, no event, 
paving work on the road, and an incident on the road. After selecting the type of event, the third 
critical decision variable of distance to the event is screened by the algorithm. If for instance, the 
event is less than 0.2 miles away from the gantry location, the last decision variable is screened 
to find the lane on which the event is occurring. Once these critical variables are screened and 
appropriate decision variables are selected, the applicable lane control states for display are 
selected for each of the three lanes.
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Implementation of Selected States Back to the Simulation 
 
Once the states for lane control were selected using the data from simulation model and its 
screening for appropriate traffic conditions based on the decision tree, they were transferred back 
to the VISSIM network for developing a feedback loop that operates in continuity. The driving 
behavior of the vehicles was also controlled according to the selected lane control states using 
VISSIM API. The vehicles at the upstream location, which were required to comply with the 
variable lane control states were controlled to conduct lane merge to the adjacent lane when it 
was recommended by the decision of the lane control states application and were not allowed to 
travel in specific lanes when the lane control state algorithm indicated a lane closure.   
 
DEVELOPMENT OF A MONITORING SYSTEM 
 
The objective of this step was to develop a monitoring system, starting with the identification of 
entry points for cyberattacks within the ATM system, and then ending with proposing examples 
for the development of monitoring system architecture based on the identified attack points. 
Based on the results of this step, a prototype monitoring system was finally developed. 
 
Identification of Entry Points 
 
The identification of entry points requires clear description of the ATM architecture in terms of 
its data flow. The data flow diagram in Figure 5 shows the functional aspects of lane control 
states along with likely entry points for cyberattacks. The lane control states are connected to the 
network switches in the cabinets provided at each of the gantry locations, from where they are 
again connected into the existing fiber optic cable that runs to the TMC where the ATM software 
is installed. The ATM system is built around data collection from various roadway traffic 
detectors, environmental condition detectors, and monitoring through CCTV. The data collected 
is used to detect any unusual behavior such as congestion and incidents, which is processed by 
the ATM software using predefined logic to come up with appropriate response plans in terms of 
which lane control states to display on the road network. Additional connections to private sector 
probe data providers, such as Inrix, and Internet of things (IoT) devices also exist. The testbed 
network developed in VISSIM mimics the data flow architecture of I-66 ATM system, with 
vehicle detectors as the main data source. The attack points that are likely to be compromised by 
an adversary in the prototype system includes point A (the ATM software itself), point B (data 
source such as detectors), and point C (connection between field device, lane control states and 
cabinet at gantry location). The adversary can affect the normal operation of the lane control 
states by gaining access to any of these three attack points for instance, gaining access to the 
ATM software through point A can allow the adversary to change the final decision generated by 
the ATM software algorithm and send any desired set of states for display on the gantries. 
Similarly, gaining access to the detectors through point B can allow adversary to send 
manipulated set of traffic data to the ATM software that may lead to generation of wrong states 
for display. Finally, gaining access to the gantry display through point C may allow the 
adversary to manipulate the decision for display of lane control states received from the ATM 
software algorithm and display any desired states on the gantries. 
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Development of Monitoring System Architecture 
 
It is important to make it clear that the monitoring system developed in this research is tasked 
with monitoring the operation of the ATM system itself.  We traditionally think of monitoring in 
traffic management as the use of detectors to measure speed and volume of vehicles. This 
provides an understanding of the system state.  In a cybersecurity monitoring system – we are 
monitoring the functioning of the ATM system itself to be sure it is behaving as expected. 
Furthermore, the main purpose of developing a monitoring system is to add further redundancy 
to the existing system so as to make it difficult for an attacker to achieve his or her motives. The 
architecture of the proposed monitoring system for the identified attack points is shown in Figure 
6. Figure 6a and 6b provide examples of separate monitoring systems for attack points A and B. 
The proposed monitoring systems consists of two channels that process the traffic data 
independently; (a) one channel is associated with the operations of ATM application and (b) 
another channel is associated with the monitoring system, which decides the control decision and 
display states independently and matches the decision with that of the other channel associated 
with the ATM application. The two channels are communication paths, receiving data from two 
separate or same sources that is further processed for deciding lane control states. The difference 
between the two-individual monitoring systems shown in Figure 6a and 6b is in the data source 
processed by the monitoring channel i.e. the monitoring system for attack point A has only one 
data source of detectors, which is fed into both monitoring and ATM channel while the 
monitoring system for attack point B uses a different data source such as (historical data, CV 
data or data from CCTV) for the monitoring channel.    
 
Similarly, the example for architecture of monitoring system proposed for attack point C is 
provided in Figure 6c. The monitoring system will again operate on the same principle with two 
different channels processing data independently (a) one channel associated with the operation of 
ATM application and (b) another channel associated with the monitoring system, which decides 
the control decision and display lane control states independently and matches the decision with 
that of the other channel associated with the ATM application. Here the states being displayed on 
the gantry are viewed through CCTV and matched with the states generated by the channel 
associated with the monitoring system. Based on the matching step, the possibility of a 
cyberattack will be decided like the previous monitoring system and in case of a cyberattack, 
lane control states selected by the monitoring channel will be displayed on the network and the 
operator will also be alerted of a possible cyberattack.  
 
Development of a Prototype Monitoring System 
 
Based on the example architectures proposed in previous section, a prototype monitoring system 
was developed for the ATM system. Figure 7 represents the architecture of the prototype 
monitoring system for multiple attack points A and B developed in this project. The traffic data 
is processed by two different channels; (a) one channel is associated with the operations of ATM 
application that receives data from detectors embedded in the network and (b) another channel is 
associated with the monitoring system, which receives data from CVs. Both channels decide the 
control decision and display lane control states independently. The lane control states generated 
by the two independent channels are matched by the monitoring system for detection of 
anomalies. It should be noted that both the monitoring channel and the ATM channel operate on 
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the same logic but utilize the data from different sources. A 100% CV penetration was assumed 
in the simulation environment and data from individual vehicles were sent to the monitoring 
channel for generating lane control states. If any type of deviation is observed during the 
matching step, the monitoring system report it as an anomaly, or a cyberattack is possibly 
occurring. In case of anomaly detection, the monitoring system cedes the states generated by 
ATM channel and displays the lane control states generated by monitoring channel over the 
network. The monitoring system also provides an alert to the operator but if no deviation is 
observed during the matching step, the lane control states generated by the ATM algorithm are 
displayed on the network.  
 
EVALUATION RESULTS 
 
The impact of a possible attack on the prototype ATM system, reverting back to a safe lane 
control state using a monitoring system and running the ATM system without a monitoring 
system was evaluated using VISSIM microscopic simulations. In this evaluation, four cases were 
prepared and used, depending on the existence of an ATM system, cyberattacks, and a 
monitoring system. These cases were:  
• Baseline: without an ATM system, cyberattacks, and a monitoring system. 
• Case 1: with an ATM system; but without cyberattacks, and a monitoring system. 
• Case 2: with an ATM system, and cyberattacks; but without a monitoring system. 
• Case 3: with an ATM system, cyberattacks, and a monitoring system.  
 
For all the cases, an incident was created at the far downstream location of the 1.5mile test 
freeway segment, in an attempt to create a situation where an ATM system is needed. The ATM 
system described in the previous section was modeled in VISSIM and cyberattacks were 
randomly generated during the simulation using the COM interface and C# in Visual Studio. For 
the attacks at point A, the lane control states were randomly changed while, for the attacks at 
point B, the detector data was randomly scrambled. Lastly, if any anomalies in lane control states 
were detected, the monitoring system reverted the compromised lane control states back to the 
ones created by the monitoring channel using a different source of data, i.e. CV data. 55 
replications for each of the four cases, with each replication running for 10 minutes with a warm-
up period of 2 minutes, were conducted and the results are provided below. 
 
This evaluation basically involved the comparison of mean speeds from all four cases using 
paired t-tests, assuming a null hypothesis that the two means were equal. The results are 
presented in Table 1 and the interpretations are provided below: 
• Baseline: without an ATM system, cyberattacks, and a monitoring system  
o This is the base case without an ATM system. Hence no attacks can happen and 
thus a monitoring system is not needed.  
o A mean speed of 53mph was obtained in this Baseline case. 
• Case 1: with an ATM system; but without cyberattacks, and a monitoring system 
o This Case 1 added an ATM system on top of the Baseline case. The ATM system 
provided a set of lane control states to better manage and operate traffic according 
to the prevailing traffic situations. 
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o It was found out that, with an ATM system in operation, the mean speed has 
improved to 60mph (13% increase from 53 mph of Baseline). This is statically 
significant with a p-value less than 0.01. 
• Case 2: with an ATM system, and cyberattacks; but without a monitoring system 
o In Case 2, random cyberattacks were generated, which compromised the original 
ATM lane control states and resulted in a set of “random” lane control states that 
may have a negative impact on traffic.  
o The mean speed in Case 2 under attacks was degraded to 51mph, a reduction of 
15% from 60mph of Case 1. This degradation was found to be statistically 
significant (p-value <0.01).  
o Also, the Case 2 mean speed (51mph) was similar to the Baseline mean speed 
(53mph), implying that the effectiveness of the ATM was negated by attacks. 
• Case 3: with an ATM system, cyberattacks, and a monitoring system 
o Lastly, Case 3 added a monitoring system on Case 2. The monitoring system 
detected anomalies in lane control states created by attacks, and rectified the 
compromised states as needed.  
o With the monitoring system, the mean speed was improved back to 59mph, 16% 
increase compared to Case 2 with a statistical significance (p-value <0.01). 
o This Case 3 mean speed of 59mph was also found to be similar to the Case 1 
speed of 60mph. The implication is that the monitoring system effectively 
overcame the negative impact created by cyberattacks and allowed the ATM 
system to function as intended.  
 
In summary, this research has demonstrated that a cyberattack monitoring system has the 
potential to limit the impact of attacks on an ATM system and improve freeway operations.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The research effort presented in this paper is a first step of a huge undertaking; i.e. investigating, 
analyzing, and addressing cyber security issues expected in various transportation-related 
systems in the very near future, from a holistic point of view. The goal here was to demonstrate 
the issues and a possible solution to highlight the significance of the cyber security analysis, 
rather than solving the problems. For this, we took the ATM system as an example and the 
simulation results were presented for this purpose.  
 
This study is one of the first attempts to investigate cybersecurity issues in Active Traffic 
Management systems. A 1.5-mile section of the ATM system deployed on I-66 in Northern 
Virginia was selected as a case study. First, a prototype ATM system was developed based on 
the concept of operations of the actual ATM system in Northern Virginia. Then a prototype 
monitoring system was developed to detect anomalies in ATM operations and to avoid the 
consequences of a compromised system by cyberattacks. The monitoring system leverages on 
real time data by comparing the lane control states generated by two different channels, i.e. the 
ATM channel and the monitoring channel. In case of any deviation between two sets of lane 
control states, the monitoring system starts displaying the lane control states generated by the CV 
data and alerts the operator. 
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The evaluation results showed that the ATM system could increase the mean vehicle speed in the 
system by 13% compared to the baseline case. However, when subject to cyberattack through 
manipulation of traffic data or the lane control states through the ATM software, mean speed was 
similar to the baseline case and reduced by 15% compared to the case with the ATM system. 
This illustrates that the effectiveness of the ATM system was negated by cyberattacks. The 
monitoring system however, allowed the ATM system to revert to an expected state with a mean 
speed of 59mph and reduced the negative impact of cyberattacks. It is therefore, reasonable to 
say that the proposed monitoring system was successful in avoiding the severe consequences of 
cyberattacks and has significant potential in improving freeway operations. Hence, it is necessary 
to further continue the effort for developing and evaluating more rigorous monitoring systems, 
along with revisiting ATM system design concepts as a means to protect against cyberattacks in 
addition to traditional system intrusion prevention approaches. 
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Table 1 Evaluation Results for ATM Monitoring System 
Scenario 
Presence of Mean 
Speed 
(mph) 
Standard 
Deviation 
% 
Changes 
p-value 
% 
Changes 
p-value 
% 
Changes 
p-value 
ATM 
Cyber-
attack 
Monitoring  
System 
Baseline No No No 53 20 
Base 
value 
compared 
to 
N/A N/A 
Case 1 Yes No No 60 14 
13% 
<0.01 
Base 
value 
compared 
to 
N/A 
Case 2 Yes Yes No 51 24 
-4% 
>0.11 
-15% 
<0.01 
Base 
value 
compared 
to 
Case 3 Yes Yes Yes 59 15 
11% 
<0.01  
-2% 
>0.11 
16% 
<0.01 
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FIGURE 6 Example Architecture of Monitoring Systems 
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b) Architecture of Monitoring System for Attack Point B (Detectors) 
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c) Architecture of Monitoring System for Attack Point C (gantry locations) 
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